A Conservative Concept of Rights

Co-founder of Whole Nation Conservatives Miranda Jupp is a longstanding North East Conservative activist and former council candidate. Prior to the 2024 General Election she was Chief of Staff to Sir Simon Clarke.

Far too often we see ‘Human Rights’ being used as a justification for prioritising the interests of those who have broken the rules over the law abiding majority. From foreign national offenders avoiding deportation to the use of lawfare to block attempts by the last Conservative administration to implement a serious deterrent to illegal immigration through the Rwanda scheme, there have been multiple examples which give growing grounds for scepticism of the whole concept of rights. 

However, whilst the current legislative framework, such as the Human Rights Act, is undoubtedly not fit for purpose, this doesn’t mean that there isn’t a better approach which both respects the idea of individual level rights and takes into account the corresponding societal responsibilities. Articulating a more symmetrical rights framework, which acknowledges the contractual nature of rights within a social context, can provide an important foundation for an authentic Conservative approach to these issues.

As a society, we accept the fact that the state, through the rule of law, places some constraints on our freedom in order to guarantee our security. Without this trade off, human interaction would potentially be a constant battle of self interest, described by Hobbes as “a war of all against all”. This social contract is an essential foundation for many of our rights: property rights for example would be pretty meaningless in the absence of rules deterring the strongest from taking the possessions of those unable to defend themselves. 

There is therefore in practice a degree of reciprocity involved in how we experience ‘rights’: our own freedoms are grounded in the respect others show for them. We abide by the social conventions which limit our ability to pursue pure self interest in order that we benefit from the security of others doing likewise.

We also accept that when an individual disregards the constraint of the social contract and breaks the law, the state has the authority to restrict their freedom (whether through a custodial sentence or a fine) to protect the community. (Almost) no one would cite an inalienable right to liberty as reasonable grounds against the imprisonment of a murderer!

This illustrates the clear precedent for the contingent (as opposed to absolute) nature of rights in practice. Where individuals disrespect the rights of others by breaking the law, they are in breach of their contract with society, and hence forfeit the opportunity of their individual interests being considered as of equal import as the interests of wider society. This is not to deny them any moral status, but where the state seeks to balance conflicting rights, it is right to give preference to law-abiding citizens.

Determining exactly how to navigate this balancing act is, within reason, a political matter, rather than a purely legal one. If democratically accountable ministers judge that foreign national offenders should be deported, prisoners should forfeit the right to vote, those who have violated immigration law be processed overseas, or indeed that perpetrators of the most heinous crimes should face whole life orders (or perhaps even the death penalty) then it is for the electorate to assess these decisions, not for the courts to override them. In this context, Badenoch’s recently commissioned lawfare review is welcome and we look forward to seeing the conclusions at party conference.